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LECTURE
COLOR AT CENTURY'S END:
RACE IN LAW, POLICY, AND POLITICS
Christopher Edley, Jr.*
At century's end, the question I want to ask with respect to racial
and ethnic justice in America and our long-standing struggle with the
challenges of color, is: What now? Where do we go from here?
From President Clinton's perspective, the question is: Serving as
the last President of the twentieth century, how can I build a worth-
while legacy regarding this problem that is 150 years older than the
nation itself?
So my conceit for this talk is to put yourselves in my shoes, as some-
one who serendilitously has the ear of the President on this issue and
seems to have a platform to talk to people in the civil rights commu-
nity about it. How would you answer these questions? What now?
Where do we go from here?
My discussion has three parts, because I think to answer those ques-
tions you have to have three subsidiary inquiries: one is taking stock;
second is some vision-what do we think we ought to mean by racial
and ethnic justice in the twenty-first century; and the third is some
sense of program-how to achieve that vision.
TAKING STOCK
Let me start with taking stock. In summary, our situation is the
cliche: We've come a long way; we have a long way to go. But let me
just place a few observations on the table for consideration.
Social Facts
First, with respect to disparities along lines of color, the black un-
employment rate continues to hover at twice that of whites, being the
first to rise in recessions and the last to fall as recovery begins.' Fur-
thermore, black employment is more volatile than white, so that the
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Senior Advisor to President Clinton
for the Race Initiative; Consultant to President Clinton's Advisory Board on Racial
Reconciliation; author of Not All Black and White: Affirmative Action, Race and
American Values (1996) and Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bu-
reaucracy (1992). This Article is a revised version of the Robert L Levine Distin-
guished Lecture, delivered at Fordham University School of Law on March 11, 1998.
1. Professor Edley compiled this information from statistics and empirical studies
from expert sources within the executive branch. See Christopher Edley, Jr., Not All
Black and White: Affirmative Action, Race, and American Values 42-52 (1996).
These sources include the Council of Economic Advisers, the Department of Justice,
the Equal Opportunity Commission, the Civil Rights Commission, and the Depart-
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effect of recessions is more severe.2 In the 1981-1982 recession, for
example, the last one for which this kind of data is available, nearly
one of every ten employed blacks lost his or her job-one of every
ten-while fewer than two of every 100 employed whites lost their
jobs.3
Consider poverty. Poverty for children-while one of every seven
white children under the age of six lives below the poverty line, one of
every two black children does, and almost that figure for Hispanics."
The overall poverty rate for whites is one-third that for blacks, about
11.5% of whites versus 33% for African Americans.5
The black-to-white ratio of median earnings has been stuck in the
mid-50% to mid-60% range for two decades. There was improve-
ment, but then it stalled, and we have been stuck.6 The median an-
nual income for black males working full time is 30% less than for
white males.7
But if one considers wealth rather than income, the disparities are
even more dramatic, and alarmingly so. So while you can think of the
income gap in terms of earnings at 62% that of whites, the median
wealth or net worth of blacks is only 8% that of the median wealth of
whites; 8 Hispanics just slightly better than that 8%. 9
Bear in mind the implications. Many observers have developed a
habit of celebrating the expansion of the black middle class. I urge
you to remember, however, that the measure of middle-class status
used in those reports centers on income-that is, week-to-week,
month-to-month, cash flow income. But the wealth data indicate that,
overwhelmingly, the black middle class is two paychecks away from
poverty because there is no wealth to fall back on in the event of any.
In many respects, that measure of wealth, 8% that of whites, 0 is an
indicator of the legacy of inherited disadvantage from generations-
indeed, centuries-of prejudice, discrimination, and worse.
ment of Labor. See id. The Editorial Board of the Fordham Law Review relies on
Professor Edley for the accuracy of this information.
2. See id. at 42-43; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of the statistics).
3. See Edley, supra note 1, at 43; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
4. See Edley, supra note 1, at 43; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
5. See Edley, supra note 1, at 43; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
6. See Edley, supra note 1, at 43; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
7. See Edley, supra note 1, at 43; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
8. See Edley, supra note 1, at 44; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
9. Economic Report of the President: Transmitted to Congress February 1998,
Together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers 129 (1998).
10. See Edley, supra note 1, at 44; see also supra note 1 (explaining the source of
the statistics).
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Now, disparities, of course, are not identical to discrimination.
They are important social facts, and we have to consider disparities
when we are trying to decide where America is and where we need to
go. The disparities help us decide the agenda for our future.
But on discrimination the evidence is also quite troubling. The
traditional social science methodology, of course, is to do detailed sta-
tistical and econometric studies, trying to explain differences in wages,
differences in income, and the like, by taking account of as many indi-
vidual characteristics as imagination and data permit-education, age,
geography, and so forth-and then consider the residual unexplained
variances, the unexplained disparities, to be attributable to discrimina-
tion. There have always been, and will no doubt continue to be, vigor-
ous argument about such statistical efforts to define and demonstrate
discrimination, particularly when we move from employment to such
areas as housing, mortgage lending, and credit.
But in many ways, I think, the more compelling kind of evidence is
what has recently been developed through the use of so-called testers,
or auditors, where matched pairs of individuals are sent to apply for a
job that has been advertised in the newspaper or to try to rent an
apartment." In the last several years, in hundreds upon hundreds of
testing incidents in dozens of studies across sectors and in several met-
ropolitan areas, the evidence is overwhelming that discrimination re-
mains very much alive in our social and economic lives.'2
For example, in employment, African Americans and Latinos in
five major metropolitan areas experienced discrimination 20% of the
time in going to apply for a job.'3 Let me just make sure you under-
stand that. Two people, one white, one minority, matched in every
conceivable characteristic, given virtually identical r6sums, dressed
the same, with similar speech patterns, sent to apply for an entry level
job that has been listed in the newspaper. 4 The minority tester is
told, "I'm sorry, nothing's available," or "I'm sorry, the only job avail-
able is as a dishwasher." Twenty minutes later, the white tester goes
11. See generally Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimina-
tion in America (Michael Fix & Raymond J. Struyk eds., 1993) [hereinafter Clear and
Convincing Evidence] (collecting articles discussing the methodology, results, and
policy implications of testing for discrimination using the technique of auditing);
United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., Progress or Retreat? Testing and
the Need for a National Report Card on Discrimination (Michael Fix & Margery
Austin Turner, eds., forthcoming) (collecting articles discussing the state of results and
methodological issues concerning testing in a number of sectors, prepared under con-
tract to HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research).
12. See generally Clear and Convincing Evidence, supra note 11 (collecting the
articles discussing the methodology, results, and policy implications of testing for dis-
crimination using the technique of auditing).
13. See Richard B. Mincy, The Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Research and
Policy Context, in Clear and Convincing Evidence, supra note 11, at 169, 173.
14. See Michael Fix et al., An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination, in Clear
and Convincing Evidence, supra note 11, at 1, 1-2.
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and is told, "Why yes, we have three openings. Here's the benefits
package. When can you start?"
In housing, black and Hispanic testers face discrimination approxi-
mately 28% of the time in housing searches for rental and purchase.1 5
Again, keep in mind the picture: minority tester goes to see the land-
lord; the landlord says, "I'm sorry, we just rented that apartment."
Twenty minutes later, the white tester goes and the landlord says, "We
have three available. Do you want a two-bedroom or a three-bed-
room? Don't worry, you don't need a security deposit."' 6
Now, the minority tester walks away from this situation with no clue
that he or she may have been the victim of discrimination, right? The
landlord says "There's nothing available," you shrug your shoulders
and say, "Bad luck." It is only in the aggregate picture that the true
social disease seems evident. This have-a-nice-day form of discrimina-
tion reflects some of the subtleties that we observe. While many peo-
ple believe in an "America on the mend," the best available evidence
suggests the persistence of behaviors that are discriminatory in
character.
Legal and Policy Context
Turning now to take stock of the legal, policy, and political environ-
ment, the summary formulation is that almost everything depends on
two people: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Vice President Al
Gore. Will Justice O'Connor freeze her position and stop a slide to-
wards the conservative view that discrimination is a thing of the past,
that race must never matter in legal and policy choices? 7 If she does
freeze her steady slide in that direction and hold out until the next
election, then all will depend upon whether Al Gore or someone else
of relatively progressive views on civil rights is elected President and
appoints justices to the Supreme Court who will stay the course rather
than join the rollback in equal protection doctrine and other areas of
civil rights law.
Affirmative action is in many ways the bellwether test case for what
is going to happen with respect to several areas of legal doctrine, and
we see quite a bit of rumbling. Suffice it to say that in some circuit
15. See John Yinger, Access Denied, Access Constrained: Results and Implications
of the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study, in Clear and Convincing Evidence, supra
note 11, at 69, 103.
16. See id.
17. In Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989), Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion found that "the standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited [sic] by a particu-
lar classification." See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224
(1995) ("[Ajny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any govern-
mental actor ...justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal
treatment undert the strictest judicial scrutiny.").
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court cases-particularly in the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas,18 in
the Fourth Circuit in Podberesky v. Kirwan,'9 to some extent in the
Third Circuit in Taxman v. Board of Education ,2'-we see that a fed-
eral judiciary made quite conservative through twelve years of careful
Reagan and Bush nominations is interested in modifying civil rights
doctrine to make it more difficult for minority claims to succeed. 1
But affirmative action is not dead. Even within the civil rights ad-
vocacy community, there has been too-ready a tendency to say that we
are in "the post-affirmative action era." But it's important to note
that Bakke,.' the Supreme Court's 1978 case concerning race-con-
scious affirmative action justified by diversity in higher education, re-
mains the law of the land, at least outside of the Fifth Circuit.23 The
question is: While affirmative action is certainly under assault in the
courts, will it hold on until the political process, through the next pres-
idential election season, renders a final verdict?
Finally, taking stock politically, one has to observe that the most
important development afoot, in my view, is the burgeoning Latino
population in California24 and in several Eastern states.' With that
shift, and with the problem of low political participation increasingly
coming to the fore on the agenda of civil rights advocates, we seem to
be on the verge of what could be a very important political
realignment.
In the wake of California's Proposition 187 concerning immi-
grants, 6 and California's Proposition 209 concerning affirmative ac-
tion,27 the political dynamic in California seems to be that the
Republican Party has alienated massive numbers of both new and ex-
perienced Latino voters.' If that alienation takes hold and solidifies
18. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
19. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
20. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506, and cert. dismissed,
118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
21. See id. at 1557-58 (finding that an affirmative action plan violated Title VII
because it was not "remedial"); Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 961-62 (finding that the Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law's affirmative action admission policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 161-62 (finding that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment upholding the affirmative action program of the Uni-
versity of Maryland at College).
22. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 961-62.
24. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 34 (117th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Abstract] (calculating that over
25% of California's population is of Hispanic origin).
25. See id (calculating that nearly 10% of the Northeast's population is of His-
panic origin).
26. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48215, 66010.8 (West Supp. 1998) (excluding undocu-
mented immigrants from public education).
27. See Cal. Const. art. 1, § 31 (requiring banning race and gender affirmative ac-
tion at schools in the California university system).
28. See Gary Martin, Bonilla Junips GOP Ship over Affirmative Action, San
Antonio-Express News, May 9, 1998, at B7.
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in California, in Texas, in Florida, and in New York, the consequences
for national policy making, and for politics in general, could be quite
profound. Indeed, Texas Governor George W. Bush, the early fron-
trunner for the GOP presidential nomination in 2000, has impressive
support among his Latino constituents,2 9 as does Florida GOP guber-
natorial candidate Jeb Bush." They have won such support in part by
taking pains to distance themselves from national GOP policies that
most Hispanics consider hostile to them and to immigrants.31
Let me move beyond just a recitation of some of the facts and talk
about two particular policy areas, affirmative action and bilingual
education.
On affirmative action, in 1995, I had been working at the White
House as a senior budget official for a couple of years and was about
to leave to go back to Harvard to do something about the footnote
deficit that is afflicting Western civilization-but several people pre-
vailed upon me to direct the President's review of affirmative action.
It looked, in late-1994 and early-1995, as though the new Republican
majority in Congress would make a concerted effort to dismantle af-
firmative action programs, certainly targeted federal programs created
by statute or executive action, and perhaps even amending Title VII
to curb voluntary private sector affirmative action in employment.
Some of us on the White House Staff thought it would be important to
try to develop an Administration policy in advance of the anticipated
onslaught.
We met with the President, who had read a large pile of material we
provided. He said, "Look, the first thing I want to do is understand all
the facts. I want to understand what works and what doesn't work on
these affirmative action programs. So let's do a review. I'd like a
thorough review of all the affirmative action policies and issues." I
think it's fair to say that all of us thought that this was a terrible idea,
because of the inevitable delay, the difficulty of defining terms, and so
forth. But it turned out that only one person had a vote. For better or
worse, I decided to stick around and lead that review.
Our first substantive conversation in the Oval Office, in the winter
of 1995, began with the Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta saying, "Mr. Pres-
ident, why don't we start by your telling us your basic position on
affirmative action."
The President said, "Well, I believe in equal opportunity, I'm
against quotas, and I'm for vigorous enforcement of the anti-discrimi-
nation laws."
29. See Paul West, Going All-Out to Win El Paso, Baltimore Sun, Oct. 21, 1998, at
2A.
30. See Nationally, Parties Work to Attract Latino Support: Group's Votes Needed
in High-Stakes Votes, Idaho Statesman, Oct. 4, 1998 at 12A.
31. See Rene Sanchez, Both Parties Courting Latinos Vigorously: California GOP
Tries Strategy of Inclusion, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1998, at A12.
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Everybody said, "Good, good, sounds great, fine."
I said, "Wait a minute. What does that mean? I mean, I can't think
of any mainstream politician who couldn't say exactly those words.
David Duke could say exactly those words." Remember, I was on
leave; and could talk like that because I had tenure back at Harvard.
The President said, "I don't understand. What are you talking
about?"
I said, look, you say you're for equal opportunity, but there's a big
argument about how to define equal opportunity. Are you thinking
equal opportunity in the sense that Lyndon Johnson was when he
talked about it not being equality to simply bring the white man and
the black man to the starting line of the footrace, remove the latter 's
shackles, and say, "You're free; everything's equal, now run"; or does
your notion of equal opportunity include some measure of remedia-
tion, or even reparation? What do you mean? And you say you're for
vigorous enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws, but what do you
mean by discrimination? Some people believe that discrimination ex-
ists whenever I can point to a social or economic statistical disparity.
Other people believe that to demonstrate discrimination you need an
identifiable victim and an identifiable perpetrator with racial animus
dripping like venom from the lips. So where along the spectrum do
you define discrimination?
He said, "Oh, I see, I see."
I said, "Look, that's just the beginning. That's how you define dis-
crimination. Now how do you prove it? What kind of evidence?
And, having established it, what kind of remedy are you prepared to
support in order to solve the problem?"
Lesson number one: This can't be about platitudes; this can't be
about the easy phrases calculated to paper over our disagreements
rather than expose and close our differences.
Well, how much discrimination is there? A little later in the spring,
during the course of this review, a group of us were preparing the
President for a press conference. This is an exercise in which you sit
around the table in the Cabinet Room and people throw out ques-
tions: "Mr. President, what's your position on the latest developments
in Bosnia?" "Mr. President, what's your position on the cost overrun
on the NASA space station program?" "Mr. President, what's your
position on affirmative action?"
Asked that question, the President launched into a wonderful mon-
ologue, a soliloquy, talking about the social science evidence demon-
strating the persistence of discrimination, especially the tester studies
I just described. "And that's why," said the President, "we continue
to need affirmative action, because we need an effective remedy to
combat and prevent discrimination."
Everybody said, "Ah, great! Terrific, terrific!"
1998]
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I said, "I'm not so sure. Look, you did your homework. You get an
A. Everything you said was right. But the problem is that your audi-
ence sitting there watching you on television doesn't believe that they
discriminate, doesn't believe their friends discriminate. They're going
to listen to you talking about discrimination and think: 'There goes
old liberal Bill Clinton. He thinks there's a racist behind every tree.
What planet is he on?' I mean, don't get me wrong. I want you to
educate the public about discrimination, but it requires relentless
teaching, not a simple Q&A in a press conference."
He said, "All right, all right. So what do you want me to say?"
I said, "Well, I don't know. But look, how about this? Most of us, I
think, would admit that we have a simple human tendency to prefer
people, to gravitate towards people, who are like ourselves. When
you're making a decision about with whom to have dinner, whom to
date, maybe whom to worship with, maybe whom to hire, or promote,
or do business with, you are probably looking for some kind of con-
nection, some basis for affinity, something that signals that the other
person is like you. And, all too often, still, in America, color-not
only color, but color certainly-gets in the way of that connection.
"Now, if most of us prefer people we think are like us and act on
that basis, and we aggregate all of those little preferences over our
social and economic interactions, then in the aggregate it may amount
to the denial of opportunity. Here's the key: In an important sense, it
doesn't matter whether you call that discrimination or not. It's not the
kind of America we want. One thing that affirmative action does is
give us a tool to lean against that simple tendency to prefer people
who are like ourselves, to open us to the possibilities of all of
humanity."
He said, "Great, I like that, I like that." And he went out and gave
his press conference; nobody asked him about affirmative action.
I have two points about this. Discrimination is a label that we apply
to a circumstance or a behavior and it's sort of conclusory. It really
represents a conclusion that "this is wrong, and we want to do some-
thing about it." Second, there is a value choice at stake in deciding
what circumstances and behaviors are going to receive that label.
When a Korean grocer in the middle of an African American commu-
nity decides she would like to hire kinfolk to work in the store, people
with whom she feels comfortable, is that discrimination or is that fam-
ily? And even if you think it's not really right, do you then decide that
you want the state, the government, to regulate it?3"
So, there is a value at stake and we have conflicts over those values,
reflecting deeper disagreements about our vision of what kind of com-
32. Of course, Title VII answers this by saying that employers with fewer than
fifteen workers are exempt from Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). But the
important question from the perspective of the President or any leader is not simply
what is the law, but what should be in the law.
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munity we want and how to achieve it. You cannot escape the values
conflict by saying, "I'm for vigorous enforcement of the anti-discrimi-
nation laws, aren't you?"
Let me make one related point, if I can elevate the discussion just a
moment and talk about the O.J. Simpson case. You may recall-you
certainly recall if you were breathing-Mark Fuhrman, the allegedly
racist L.A. cop. According to opinion polls taken around the time of
the incident, roughly two-thirds of Latino and black residents in L.A.
County felt that Mark Fuhrman was the tip of the iceberg, that there
were lots more where he came from; while roughly two-thirds of the
Anglo community felt that Mark Fuhrman was just an aberration, an
isolated example.33 This indicates radically different perceptions of
the world, just like radically different perceptions of the extent to
which discrimination continues to be a problem.
It's no surprise that with these radically different perceptions comes
a likelihood that there will be racial divisions in assessing the credibil-
ity of a witness, or the plausibility of a conspiracy theory, or indeed
the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. These differences in per-
ceptions and differences in values obviously arise, at least in part,
from the separation between our communities and the experiences re-
lated to those separate community existences.
If I can drive home the value point just one more way. In the sec-
ond or third meeting with the President back in 1995, I put it this way:
"Mr. President, we have to talk about color blindness. Now, here is
one way to think about it: Do you believe that there is a moral cost to
making decisions about people based upon immutable characteristics,
like race, gender? Is there a moral cost?"
Now, this is a multiple-choice question. Answer number one: Yes,
there is a moral cost, and the cost is so great that we should never be
willing to pay it. That's the position of some folks who embrace color
blindness.
Answer number three: Well, no, there is no particular moral cost.
After all, society allocates benefits and burdens based on all manner
of characteristics all the time. You decide where to build a highway or
how to structure the tax code; there are winners and losers. We allo-
cate benefits based on where you live, how athletic you are, how rich
you are. So long as you are not doing it for some invidious purpose
(whatever that means), there is no particular moral problem with allo-
cating benefits and burdens based upon color.
I think both of those positions are wrong. The third answer is
wrong because race is different. Defenders of affirmative action
sometimes say, "Look, why shouldn't we have race-conscious affirma-
tive action in higher education? After all, we have affirmative action
33. See Cathleen Decker, The Simpson Legacy: L.A. Times Poll, L.A. Times, Oct.
10, 1995, at S1.
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for athletes, and for people from Iowa. So why not for historically
under-served minorities?" I think the answer to that is race is differ-
ent because: (a) we fought a civil war, and (b) it feels different. Imag-
ine yourself telling someone that they didn't get the job or they didn't
get the spot in law school because-"We have enough people from
Iowa, thank you very much" or "We have enough people with skin
color like yours." It feels different to use race or ethnicity, and I be-
lieve there is a moral truth to the fact that it feels different.
The import of the fact that we have so-called preferences for ath-
letes and Iowans is simply that we do not in fact have a rigid commit-
ment to a particular view of merit that is driven exclusively by test
scores. We think about the excellence of the institution along many
dimensions, including geographical diversity and variety of student in-
terests. Therefore, it is not necessarily inconsistent with the concep-
tion of excellence to think about racial or other forms of diversity as
well. It's a question of how you do it.
So, if it is wrong (in my moral view) to argue that there is no partic-
ular cost to using race as a factor in decision making, does it follow
that the first answer is correct? There is a moral cost so great we
should never be willing to pay it. That position, I believe, boils down
to a question of effectiveness. If I show you compelling social science
evidence that there is continuing discrimination, and I further per-
suade you that piecemeal litigation is an inadequate tool to combat it
and prevent it because of the inefficiencies of litigation and because
"have a nice day discrimination" is not vulnerable to individualized
suits, then will you agree that affirmative action-race-conscious
measures, gender-conscious measures-may be necessary in order to
combat, to remedy, that kind of discrimination?
To explore this, let me talk briefly about the death penalty. Some
people have a view about the death penalty that depends upon a utili-
tarian or consequentialist calculation: Will it deter violent crime? I
will examine the social science evidence. If I look at the evidence and
the evidence indicates that it is an effective deterrent, then I support
the death penalty. Or, I may look at the evidence, see that it doesn't
effectively deter crime, so I oppose the death penalty. It doesn't mat-
ter. My point is this is a community of people who make a value
choice that is rooted in consequentialist terms; they are looking for an
effective strategy to combat violent crime. Effectiveness matters.
Now, there is another community of folks whose view about the
death penalty has nothing to do with utilitarian or consequentialist
calculations. It's more kind of a Kantian thing. They are saying, per-
haps, "I believe in the sanctity of human life and, therefore, an eye for
an eye; I support the death penalty." Or they may cite the sanctity of
life but conclude, "Therefore, the state should never take another's
life; and I oppose the death penalty."
[Vol. 67
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My point is that folks in this second moral community do not care
about the social science evidence, they do not care about calculating
the effectiveness of a particular policy choice. Their calculation is of a
different sort.
I understand these two moral positions. And between the two,
there is a value choice at stake. For me, in late twentieth-century
America, I care about effectiveness because we have gone too long
without an effective strategy to purge America of the legacy of racial
supremacist ideology in its myriad expressions and manifestations.
Answer number two is: Yes, there is a moral cost to making deci-
sions about people based upon color, but it is a cost we ought to be
willing to pay in at least some circumstances. That is where I came
down; that is where the President comes down; that actually is, cur-
rently at least, where constitutional law comes down. That is re-
flected in strict scrutiny doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause,
suggesting that if there is a compelling interest, government can take
account of race in making its decisions, provided the measure is nar-
rowly tailored. 5 The hard question is to argue through the particulars
in the circumstances.
But the value choice represented by the debate about color blind-
ness, the value choice represented in the definition of discrimination,
the differences in perceptions represented by empirical propositions
about discrimination and the like-all of these are deeply controver-
sial matters and we are not doing an effective job in civic discourse of
engaging them.
I am fond of saying of this whole mess that it is not rocket science;
this is harder than rocket science-and we are ill served by leaders or
scholars who approach the subject with platitudes alone.
On bilingual education, as a second example in taking stock, let me
simply say that this is a huge conundrum for a number of reasons. Let
me tick off four.
One is that the situation in the education of Hispanics is truly des-
perate. The disparities in educational attainment and achievement are
daunting, and the racial isolation of Latinos in public schools is wors-
ening; Latinos are more segregated in California than blacks are in
Mississippi and Alabama. 6 The general question is: How much pa-
tience will we have for the educational disaster within minority com-
munities. And in particular, what about the crisis in Hispanic
education? How much patience will we have in dealing with it and
how will we allocate responsibility for achieving a remedy?
34. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (finding that
race-based action is constitutionally permissible if it is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling interest).
35. See id.
36. See William J. Eaton, Segregation in U.S. Sdtools on Rise, Study Finds, LA.
Times, Dec. 14, 1993, at Al.
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There is a second thing that is at issue in this debate right now, and
that is the confused research on the effectiveness of bilingual educa-
tion. There have been a lot of studies-I just read a meta-analysis of
about seventy-five studies, and all but thirteen of the studies were
thrown out right away because the methodology was so lousy that it's
hard to really draw any reliable conclusions from them. 37 But of the
studies that have been done, I think-certainly in the view of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences-a fair summary would be that there is
mild evidence supporting a modest positive effect for native-language
instruction, bilingual education, in contrast with English-immersion or
English-only instruction.38
Nevertheless, the debate in the political arena makes relatively little
reference to the research literature. Instead, there are anecdotes
about grandmothers and how they learned English, and there is lurk-
ing just beneath the surface, in my view, a subtext about culture, color,
and race. Is the motivation to dismantle bilingual education in Cali-
fornia genuinely "we've got to do something more effective for the
kids," or is there an agenda fueled by resentment, fueled by nativism?
I suspect that if the true motivation were effectiveness, the research
base would play a larger role in the public debate.
In California in 1976, 78% of the population was Anglo.39 Today,
barely 50% of the population is Anglo.n0 Since 1990, there has been a
large population growth in California, 89% of that growth Latino and
Asian.4 Within a few years, there will be no majority race in Califor-
nia. 2 In four or five decades, barely 50% of the population will be
Anglo.n3
In the schools in California, the number of English-language learn-
ers, students trying to learn English, has increased by 400%.14 Fully a
quarter of all of the public school students in California are trying to
learn English.45
37. See Jay P. Greene, A Meta-Analysis of the Effectiveness of Bilingual Educa-
tion 1-11 (1998) (published as a working paper by the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute in
Claremont, California) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
38. See Improving Schooling for Language-Minority Children: A Research
Agenda 139-62 (Diane August & Kenji Hakuta, eds., 1997).
39. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 36 (110th ed. 1980).
40. See 1997 Abstract, supra note 24, at 34.
41. Compare id., with Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 24-25 (111th ed. 1991).
42. See 1997 Abstract, supra note 24, at 38.
43. See id. at 19.
44. See John Mockler, Editorial, The Wrong Turn for State Education, Sacramento
Bee, Mar. 27, 1991, at B7.
45. See Susan White, Opportunity May Knock, But Only for Those who Do Their
Homework, San Diego Union-Trib., Aug. 14, 1996, at D4.
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These demographic and cultural shifts represent an enormous chal-
lenge. At the heart of the bilingual debate is the question of national
identity, but we are not discussing it in those terms.
VISION
Now let me shift from taking stock to talking about vision. And I
confess that in taking stock I tended to focus a little bit on the glass is
half-empty rather than the glass is half-full, but that's the kind of day
I'm having. So let me move on to the vision thing because, obviously,
in saying "where do we go from here?" it would be nice to have some
sense of what the destination is. I divide the vision into pieces: one
relates to community; the other relates to substantive justice.
With respect to community, I am looking for a metaphor that de-
scribes the kind of community, the kind of nation, we want. How are
we to grapple with our increasing diversity in a constructive way; how
can we avoid, as President Clinton would put it, the "apocalyptic Bos-
nia" scenario-not next year, maybe not five years from now, but
twenty-five years from now.
The best metaphor or analogy that I have been able to come up
with is religion. The United States, it has been reported, is the most
observant, the most religious, among all the industrialized nations.46
And yet, we've not achieved that intensity of spirituality or religious
practice by all of us worshiping God in the same way; quite the con-
trary. And I think, by and large, we are quite proud of the fact that
we are a religiously diverse nation. We do not simply tolerate our reli-
gious differences (we increasingly do so, though certainly not in every
respect). I think most of us actually celebrate the fact that we live in a
society in which religious difference is part of the fabric of our lives.
We point to this diversity with pride because it is a manifestation of
the liberty we revere.
In this, it seems to me, is a picture of what we want with race and
ethnicity. You do not surrender your religious identity in order to be
an American, nor should you surrender your racial or ethnic identity
(to whom?) in order to be an American. We should not simply toler-
ate our racial and ethnic differences; we should genuinely celebrate
them as a source of richness in our lives and a source of strength in
our social and economic endeavors.
But in addition to this sort of celebration aspect of a community
vision, there also, it seems to me, has to be a connection aspect. I
mean, we do not want everybody huddled in their own enclave cele-
brating the fact that there are lots of enclaves. We would also like to
have some kind of communication, some kind of intercourse, among,
between, these enclaves, a mutuality and a connection, a better strat-
46. See W'iliam Pfaff, To Each National Culture Its Own Force of Capitalism, Int'l
Herald Trib.. Dec. 2, 1997. at 8.
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egy for dealing with difference, for conceptualizing who is "us" and
who is "them"-because let's remember the basic problem. The basic
problem is that if we are going to cohere as a society, we've got to care
about each other and be willing to invest in each other; and if color
gets in the way of caring, we are in trouble.
So this vision of community, then, is one that involves the celebra-
tion of our differences, but also involves intercourse, which implies a
model of national identity that is not melting pot, that is not assimila-
tion, but nor is it enclave-nationalism.
Now, yes, there is community in this vision, but what else can be
said? Yes, we deal better with difference, but what else must be said?
The answer, of course, is opportunity, because we have to come to
grips with the disparities I described earlier.
The vision, it seems to me, must be that a Martian will look at
America and detect no evidence, discern no evidence, that here is a
society with a history of racist supremacy ideology. We will have
leeched from the fabric of our social and economic life the taint, the
legacies, of slavery, of conquest, of colonization.
To put it differently, in a Rawlsian perspective, you are standing
behind the veil of ignorance, you don't know what your color is going
to be.47 What kind of distribution of benefits and goods do you want
as related to race? What kind of lottery in life's chances do you want,
the lottery of a black man or woman, the lottery of a Latino, the lot-
tery of a white? The answer, of course, is that we would like the lot-
teries to be identical. If we prefer, behind this veil, to be members of
one subgroup rather than others, it should be on the same basis that
we might prefer to be one religions rather than another. It should not
be because the choice of subgroups will determine the opportunities
in life.
The disparities and the discrimination that we observe today are
both evidence of the legacy of disadvantage and they are barometers
of justice. So in the vision that we have to work for, it is one in which
the signs, the signals, suggest a nation healed, a history reconciled.
Now, these two agendas, community and substantive justice, are ob-
viously somewhat separable, but not entirely. In particular, it seems
to me it is impossible to suggest that we have healed ourselves in
terms of racial understanding and connection without simultaneously
having done something pretty dramatic and effective about the
disparities.
PROGRAM
Finally, let me turn to the issue of program. What are we going to
do? If that is a plausible vision, if the way in which I have taken stock
47. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-52 (1971).
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of America's current situation makes some sense, where do we go
from here? Let me talk a little bit about law, a little bit about policy
and politics, and finally, a little bit about values.
With respect to law, in the short term the critical issues are to de-
fend affirmative action and to defend disparate impact doctrine,
although not because affirmative action is a cure for all ills. It cer-
tainly, absolutely, definitely is not. All that affirmative action does is
crack open the door so that those who are already well prepared to
take advantage of the opportunities have a chance to get in the door.
But it doesn't do anything for all of the folks who are being denied
opportunities or who have been unable or unwilling to take advantage
of the opportunities before them. Affirmative action is a limited tool,
but I think it is very important to hold on to it within the legal
framework.
In the longer term, the legal agenda is to try to create enforceable
statutory rights to a foothold on the lower rungs of the opportunity
ladder-for example, in K-14 education. I am not talking about recir-
culating twenty-five-year-old arguments about substantive due pro-
cess rights to education, although such claims may be available under
some state constitutions. I am saying statutory claims-for example,
statutory arguments about a minimum opportunity to learn in educa-
tion, or different strategies with respect to housing assistance, and the
like.
The point that I am trying to make here is that leveraging the legal
system to create enforceable interests continues to be an important
strategy because the political system too often fails minorities and the
poor, and we must work to improve that.
With respect to policy and politics, surely the principal venue for
advancing the opportunity agenda, I would simply say this: the chal-
lenge is to take the inexorable demographic change that we see and
channel it into a progressive politics of opportunity, rather than into a
Balkanization of our civic life.
The demographics are suggesting increasing diversity, and the ques-
tion is: Will we have a strategy in our politics to deal constructively
with that increasing diversity, or will we splinter? In the short term,
the strategy in politics and policy has to be multi-racial coalitions and,
I think, a radicalization of our insistence upon concrete measures in
the opportunity agenda. But in the longer term, the vision has to be
for a politics that is trans-racial in character and for a policy agenda
that is trans-racial in character.
The difficulty is that too many of us want to leap over the short
term and go directly to the long term, to leap over the current
problems and challenges of color and directly say that all public pol-
icy, all private practice, must transcend race and be color blind. What
we need, in this short-cut formula, are race-silent anti-poverty strate-
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gies writ large, rather than strategies that will do something about the
festering and intense nature of disadvantage in minority communities.
The danger with the strategy of leapfrogging to a trans-racial polit-
ical and policy agenda is that we cannot get there. We cannot get
there because color systematically disables efforts to form coalitions,
and color systematically poisons civic discourse on aspects of the op-
portunity agenda because there is a corrosive, corrupting subtext of
misunderstanding, stereotypes, fear and loathing.
Why won't affluent suburbs invest in the health of the inner city?
It's clearly in their economic interest. So, why? There are several rea-
sons, but one of them is color. And so, to build the moral and the
political consensus for bold measures one needs to also have a strat-
egy for confronting the problem of color.
Turning to the program on values, I consider this the most impor-
tant aspect of all, because of what I discussed earlier. In the conversa-
tions with Clinton, perhaps the most important lesson to me was how
much of what we argue about can be understood in terms of value
choices-and, indeed, that is a lot of what is in my book.
If I am right that our disagreements are rooted in conflicts in values
and perceptions that are rooted in differences in communities, then
the real issue for the future as a strategy matter is to answer the ques-
tion: "How do you change people's values?"
How do you change people's values? Here is what you should not
do: just talk, expecting that rationality and evidence will do it.
Think back. I am sure everybody here took a course in probability
theory-well, maybe not. There is this thing in probability theory
called Bayes' Theorem, which is a normative theorem that answers the
following question: If you start with a guess about the likelihood that
some asserted fact is true, and then you get more information, how
should you revise your guess in light of the additional information?48
Consider this experiment: I give you a coin you have never seen
before. It is a Croatian dinar. I ask you the question, "Do you think
it's a fair coin? That is, what do you think the probability is of flipping
it and getting a head rather than tail?"-now, I assume there is a head
on a Croatian dinar-and, of course, you will say, "Well, 0.5, 50%
chance, 50/50, fair coin." That is your beginning, or a priori estimate.
Now flip the coin five times-heads, heads, heads, heads, heads. Now
I ask you, "Now what do you think the odds are that if you flip it you
get heads?" Bayes' Theorem will tell you that when you do the arith-
metic the numbers comes out to, say, 0.82. You really ought to revise
your estimate and guess an 82% change of getting a head. But the
experimental psychologists tell us that real human beings, like most of
48. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1353 (1971) (discussing Bayes' Theorem).
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us in this room, will not guess 82, will guess perhaps 55. Very slow to
change, very slow to update our prejudice.
Flip the coin more times, ten times, ten heads in a row. Bayes" The-
orem says there is no way the coin is fair. That instead of 50-50 you
should estimate the odds at say, 95-5. But real people will say some-
thing like 70%. Flip the coin the eleventh time-and suppose it is
tails. Real people will say, "There, see, 50/50! I told you it's a fair
coin!" Just one little piece of evidence that tends to confirm your
prejudice and you go right back to square one.
The point is that real people are very hard to educate with the facts,
very hard to educate out of their prejudices; and, moreover, any new
evidence that tends to confirm where they were in the first place and
they regress-which was the point that I was making to Clinton when
we were preparing him for the press conference. You can't just put it
out there, "here's the evidence on discrimination." It really is hard to
teach.
And values are even harder to change than perceptions. So we
need a strategy for changing values. In particular, we need to resusci-
tate the integration ideal, and I believe we need to revive the role of
spirituality in civil rights discourse. Now, this is a somewhat bizarre
claim, perhaps.
It used to be in the 1960s that leaders made a great deal of explicit
reference to theological values when they were talking about racial
and ethnic justice. The secularization of the civil rights movement,
which occurred simultaneously with the disintegration of the multi-
racial coalition in the civil rights movement in the late-1960s, has im-
poverished the tools of advocacy. We are relying too much on the
Fourteenth Amendment and not enough on the Torah, the Koran, and
the New Testament.
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RACE INITIATIVE
Let me close by suggesting briefly how Clinton's Race Initiative re-
flects some of what I just said-and again, I want to emphasize that I
am only a consultant to the President on this thing, I'm designated
schmoozer, rather than the person in charge, which means I have
deniability if it gets badly off-track. But I know that the President
agrees with this characterization, so let me offer it to you.
To make a difference, Clinton's effort has to proceed along two
tracks:
o The first track is a policy track. Yes, there needs to be policy
ideas, no question. I love policy ideas. I am a committed-in-my-bones
policy wonk. I eat public policy for breakfast. You need changes in
public policy and private practices in order to change the social and
economic facts in people's lives. That's fine. Okay, track one is pol-
icy. Great.
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But the problem is that if I give you my bold idea for saving inner
cities, that bold policy idea will be dead the moment it falls from my
lips because there is no moral or political consensus for the bold policy
measures needed to make a meaningful difference. The simple propo-
sition is that one reason we do not have that consensus is that to take
bold measures we have to care about each other, and color gets in the
way of caring.
0 So the second track of the Initiative-the values track, if you
will-has to be about community. It has to be about a strategy for
changing people's perceptions and values so that they will draw the
circle wider-change their perception of who is "us" and who is
"them"-change values in order to create the moral and the political
predicate for bold policy measures.
Now, the second track is often called the "national conversation on
race"-a phrase stolen, ironically, from Lani Guiniera 9-but that is a
bit of a misnomer, because it is not about just dialogue. It cannot be.
This is not about closing the "chat gap"; it's about closing the opportu-
nity gap. So there must be policy as well.
And the conversation is not an end in itself. The conversation has
to be the first step in creating understanding and moving people to a
different sense of community through actions, through experiences,
that will shape people's values.
Now, how? What kinds of conversations, what kinds of exper-
iences, will change people's values? The answer is I don't know. But
my premise, and the President's premise, is that the question is both
researchable and teachable, and vitally important. A major compo-
nent of the Race Initiative, therefore, is a search for what we call
promising practices, looking for the effective strategies for changing
people's values and people's sense of community.
Despite all the faltering steps along the way, I am cautiously opti-
mistic that by the end of the year the President will actually have
something to say on the subject that might be useful. Nonetheless,
meaningful changes in values and community will likely fail if we ex-
pect that leadership on this issue is going to come from Bill Clinton or
any large group of political leaders talking to us on a television tube in
four-and-a-half-second sound bites. It will not work, because this is
too hard. It's not rocket science; it is harder than rocket science. The
only way we are going to get it done is if there are leaders in institu-
tions and communities around the country who will do the homework
to figure out the strategies that could make a difference-leaders who
will take it upon themselves to be soldiers for justice.
49. Nadine Brozan, Chronicle, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1994, at D34.
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